UNITED
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S/1994/328
23 March 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 22 MARCH 1994 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I.
OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF GREECE TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Karolos Papoulias, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Greece. This letter was telexed to us this afternoon.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Adamantios Th. VASSILAKIS
Deputy Permanent Representative
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex

[Original: English]

Letter dated 22 March 1994 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Greece addressed to the President of the Security Council

Following Security Council resolution 900 and the Secretary-General's report of 11 March 1994 (S/1994/291), the urgent need for strengthening UNPROFOR became obvious. This was confirmed at the meeting that Mr. Kofi Annan convened on the 16th of March.

The urgency together with a glimmer of hope which has appeared in Bosnia-Herzegovina recently and the inability of States participating in UNPROFOR to increase their contribution of troops in order to cover existing needs, has created a tendency to discard the principle of non-participation of neighbouring States.

From the beginning of the conflict in ex-Yugoslavia, Greece has consistently opposed the participation of Balkan countries in UNPROFOR, fearing that for historical and political reasons, such participation might create strong local reactions and bring about an extension of the conflict. Our position has been shared by most of the other neighbouring States. Some of them have recently reiterated their opposition, in view of demands for such contributions.

I am writing this letter to you in order to confirm our opposition in principle to the participation of troops from Balkan States. The insisting demand of some countries to be allowed to participate in UNPROFOR reinforces our concern that motives other than purely humanitarian might be behind it.

I would be grateful if you circulate the content of this letter to the other members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Karolos PAPOULIAS
Foreign Minister of Greece

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23 March 1994
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NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The following note is issued following consultations of the whole of the Security Council, held on 23 March 1994:

"With a view to facilitating the delivery of statements by members and non-members of the Council during meetings of the Security Council, delegations wishing to distribute the text of their statements once they have been made by their representatives are requested, as was the practice in the past, to do so outside the Council Chamber in order that all speakers may have the opportunity to be heard without difficulty."

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23 March 1994

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LETTER DATED 22 MARCH 1994 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 743 (1992) of 21 February 1992, by which the Council approved the establishment of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).

In addition to the present composition of the Force, I further propose that Turkey be added to the Member States authorized to contribute military personnel to UNPROFOR.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the Members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

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LETTER DATED 23 MARCH 1994 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 22 March 1994 concerning the addition to the list of contributing countries for the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They agree with the proposal contained in your letter.

(Signed) Jean-Bernard MERIMEE
President of
the Security Council

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S/1994/332
24 March 1994
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LETTER DATED 23 MARCH 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 23 March 1994 from Mr. Omar Mustafa Almuntasser, Secretary of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation, concerning the Judgment on the territorial dispute between the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the Republic of Chad handed down by the International Court of Justice on 3 February 1994.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ali Ahmed ELHOUDERI
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 23 March 1994 from the Secretary of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya addressed to the Secretary-General

As you know, on 3 February 1994 the International Court of Justice issued its Judgment on the territorial dispute between the Great Jamahiriya and the Republic of Chad.

The Leader of the Revolution subsequently sent a special envoy to His Excellency the President of the Republic of Chad, who responded in the same manner, and there was a exchange of written and oral messages between the two in this regard.

Between 4 and 7 March 1994 I undertook a visit to N'Djamena in order to conduct talks at the invitation of my counterpart, His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Chad.

Although His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Chad did not pursue the talks in person, having entrusted them to a delegation that included the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Defence, the opportunity was nevertheless given for each side to place its position on record.

The Libyan delegation stressed that the Great Jamahiriya would abide by the Judgment of the International Court of Justice and that the Judgment had brought a definitive end to the territorial dispute between the two parties. The Judgment clarifies the status of the boundaries and determines the boundary lines but does not otherwise set forth any obligations or stipulate any measures to be taken by either party or by both. It follows that the legal consequences of the Judgment should be the subject of an agreement between the two parties. The Great Jamahiriya is of the view that all of this requires the elaboration of a mechanism to give effect to the Judgment and to determine the consequences that it entails, taking account of the fact that it was issued as a result of the Framework Agreement concluded by the two parties at Algiers in 1989 and that action is also required to carry through the implementation of the provisions of that Agreement if relations are to be cemented in an orderly manner.

The delegation of the Republic of Chad insisted that the implementation of the Judgment meant that a timetable for the withdrawal of the Libyan civil and military administration should be drawn up and that discussion of any mechanism of implementation and of the formation of committees was premature and could not be considered before agreement was reached on a timetable for withdrawal. Given this position, the first meeting to which reference has been made was adjourned on the understanding that a Chadian delegation would visit the Great Jamahiriya as soon as possible with a view to reaching agreement on a mechanism for giving effect to the Judgment, including a timetable and modalities for withdrawal.

In the framework of the consultations between the two countries, on 15 March 1994 the Leader of the Revolution received a personal envoy from President Idriss Deby. On 12 March 1994 the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya addressed a letter to President Mohamed Hosni Mubarak, in his capacity as current Chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), requesting him urgently to dispatch an Egyptian commission to supervise the Libyan withdrawal from the "Aouzou Strip" in implementation of the Judgment of the International Court of Justice and informing him that the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya would facilitate access to the Aouzou Strip for the members of the commission thus formed, so that OAU and President Mubarak could witness the implementation of the Judgment.

Finally, on 17 March 1994 the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya renewed its invitation, through the Chadian Embassy in Tripoli, for a Chadian delegation to visit the Great Jamahiriya to discuss the implementation of the Judgment of the International Court of Justice. A reply has yet to reach us.

I have deemed it appropriate to inform you of these developments and to assure you that I am confident that the readiness of the Jamahiriya to implement the Judgment is not open to doubt or subject to any conditions and that the Jamahiriya's sole objective is to arrive at a definitive solution in a sound, workable and rational manner. We shall remain determined to bring to such an end a dispute that had been of long standing and had become exacerbated before the judicial decision of early last month.

(Signed) Omar Mustafa ALMUNTASSER
Secretary of the General People's Committee
for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation

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S/1994/333
24 March 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 844 (1993), 836 (1993) AND 776 (1992)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In paragraph 6 of its resolution 844 (1993) of 18 June 1993, the Security Council invited the Secretary-General to report on a regular basis on the implementation of that resolution as well as of resolution 836 (1993) of 4 June 1993. In paragraph 5 of resolution 836 (1993) the Council decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), inter alia, to occupy some key points on the ground in addition to participating in the delivery of humanitarian relief to the population as provided for in resolution 776 (1992) of 14 September 1992. In its resolution 900 (1994) of 4 March 1994, the Council welcomed the goal of "the early reopening of Tuzla airport". The present report is submitted in order to inform the Council of my plans to direct UNPROFOR to reopen Tuzla airport, under its exclusive authority, for the delivery of humanitarian supplies and related purposes.

II. HUMANITARIAN NEEDS

2. It is estimated that approximately 800,000 people live in the Tuzla region, 240,000 of them being refugees and displaced persons and another 200,000 being considered cases in need of assistance. The economy of the region has collapsed, and the unemployment rate is close to 100 per cent. Because of the fighting in central Bosnia, the region has been effectively cut off from normal commercial traffic for almost one year, which has made almost the entire population dependent on humanitarian assistance for its survival.

3. Until the recent Framework Agreement of 1 March 1994 (see S/1994/255), the continued fighting and denial of access had significantly reduced the use of the main humanitarian supply route to Tuzla from the Dalmatian coast, and the access route from Belgrade could not meet all the needs. The shortage of basic items created social tensions in the region in the second half of 1993, which resulted in a number of demonstrations by displaced persons and local inhabitants demanding food. It was in this context, as well as in the expectation that access to the region would worsen considerably during the winter months, that

the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) requested UNPROFOR in June 1993 to initiate the necessary action to make Tuzla airport available for humanitarian airlift operations, in order to supplement the existing land convoy routes. Prior to the winter months, UNHCR reiterated its request, noting that lack of access was a very serious concern in the Tuzla region.

4. More recently, however, the Tuzla municipal authorities have declared that the population has survived the winter, despite difficulties. This was due in great measure to the efforts made by UNPROFOR, UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies to supply the town by road, as well as to another fortunately mild winter. There have also been significant improvements, since February 1994, in access to the region from Belgrade as a result of increased cooperation from the Bosnian Serb authorities. Road access from the coast has improved dramatically since the cease-fire agreement of 23 February 1994 between the Commanders of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Croatian Defence Council (S/1994/291, annex).

5. Although immediate humanitarian disaster has been avoided, the opening of Tuzla airport would greatly improve the situation in the region. Although access appears to be improving, UNHCR delivered only 25 per cent of the monthly food requirement in the region in February. In March, UNHCR is expecting to deliver between 35 and 40 per cent of the monthly requirement. In addition to the basic food requirement, UNHCR plans to deliver some 500 tons of spring agricultural seeds in the coming weeks in order to achieve some self-sufficiency in food supplies in the region later this year. Furthermore, rapid deliveries of some of the most urgently needed spare parts and materials for coal mines, power stations and water systems are required in the region, if the total collapse of the infrastructure is to be avoided. Until such time as normal commercial traffic is restored, which is yet to be achieved despite the recently improved conditions in central Bosnia, an airlift operation to Tuzla, in addition to access by land, would meet some of those urgent requirements in the region. Air operations in and out of Tuzla by fixed-wing aircraft would contribute to emergency medical evacuations from the area. Furthermore, an increased resupply for UNPROFOR troops by air would free scarce transport capacity for additional humanitarian deliveries to Tuzla by land. The improvement in the humanitarian and social conditions by airlift would also help to preserve the exceptionally multi-ethnic character of the region, a matter of some importance to the local authorities.

III. NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PARTIES

6. The opening of Tuzla airport has been repeatedly requested by the Tuzla authorities since the spring of 1993. At a meeting held on 20 October 1993 between the Tuzla authorities and representatives of UNPROFOR and the European Community Monitoring Mission, Mayor Salim Beslagic, on behalf of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, officially requested the United Nations to reopen the airport for humanitarian purposes.

7. While the Bosnian Serb authorities on the ground had not previously raised objections to the opening of the airport under United Nations control,

Dr. Karadzic, at a meeting on 18 November 1993 with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Mrs. Sadako Ogata, categorically refused to permit its opening prior to the conclusion of an overall peace settlement, stating his strong fear of possible misuse of the airport for military purposes. The same position was repeatedly expressed by Dr. Karadzic on several other occasions.

8. Given the increasing humanitarian need, I requested UNPROFOR to draw up a detailed plan for the opening of Tuzla airport (see S/1994/50). I informed the Council of this plan in my letter dated 28 January 1994 (see S/1994/94), which described three scenarios based on varying degrees of consent of the parties.

9. In pursuing the first scenario, i.e. to open the airport with the consent of the parties, my Special Representative, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, intensified his efforts to obtain such consent. On 1 February 1994, he met with President Izetbegovic and Dr. Karadzic separately, and the basic modalities for the opening of the airport were suggested to both parties in an aide mémoire for their study. Dr. Karadzic, while not agreeing to the opening, promised my Special Representative that he would explore all possible conditions for the opening of the airport. President Izetbegovic also promised to study the proposed modalities.

10. On 7 February 1994, in a meeting with my Special Representative, President Milosevic of Serbia stated that the Bosnian Serbs should not have any objection to the opening of Tuzla airport for humanitarian purposes, provided that there was a mechanism to ensure that the airport was not used for other purposes. The Government of the Russian Federation also supported my Special Representative's negotiations with the Bosnian Serbs, and offered Russian monitors to be included in the UNPROFOR presence at the airport, in order to reinforce UNPROFOR's monitoring and inspection mechanisms.

11. In the meeting with my Special Representative on 6 March 1994, Dr. Karadzic reiterated the statement he had made on 28 February 1994 in Moscow agreeing to the opening of the airport in Tuzla for humanitarian purposes under United Nations control, but he insisted that Bosnian Serb liaison officers be present at the airport in addition to the UNPROFOR monitors. (This is comparable with arrangements currently in place at Sarajevo airport.) The opening of two new air corridors was also agreed with Dr. Karadzic. The authorities of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the other hand, registered their firm opposition to the presence of Serb liaison officers, stating that monitoring should be fully entrusted to UNPROFOR only. While the issue of liaison officers is yet to be solved, I believe that the opening of Tuzla airport for UNPROFOR purposes is now feasible and that humanitarian flights will be possible before long. On 22 March 1994, with the consent of the parties, my Special Representative and the Force Commander undertook the first UNPROFOR flight by fixed-wing aircraft to Tuzla airport.

IV. STATUS OF PREPARATIONS

12. Tuzla airport is a former Yugoslav Peoples' Army (JNA) facility situated in Dubrave, approximately 10 kilometres to the south of Tuzla. The airfield is located in territory controlled by the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and

Herzegovina. It is situated on a generally flat river bed, largely wooded, and surrounded by hills. The airport facilities consist of three runways; two of these, which are located outside the main airport's boundaries, will be made unusable by UNPROFOR to prevent any possible misuse. On 8 March 1994, with the departure of the elements of the Army of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, UNPROFOR's Nordic Battalion took complete control of the airport. The airport is now a secured United Nations facility. UNPROFOR engineers have confirmed that the existing infrastructure, runway, taxiway and tower are in good condition. Fire-fighting and limited material-handling capabilities are being put in place, using the limited resources of the battalion.

13. Tuzla airport will be opened for UNPROFOR and humanitarian use only, and restricted to UNPROFOR and humanitarian airlift aircraft coordinated by UNHCR. All aircraft will be routed into Tuzla through two corridors from Zagreb and Split, respectively. While the first flights will be exclusively undertaken by UNPROFOR aircraft, pending agreement on arrangements governing humanitarian flights, it is important that humanitarian flights begin as soon as possible on a frequent and regular basis after the first few UNPROFOR flights. It is understood that, at least initially, the number of such flights may have to be limited. At first, the airport will be opened only for fair-weather landings under visual flight rules, until all the necessary technical equipment and personnel are in place to upgrade it to an all-weather capability. The airport is now ready for fair-weather landings of a limited number of flights.

V. ADDITIONAL RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS

14. In addition to the Nordic battalion already deployed at the airfield, operating Tuzla airport requires a number of support staff to carry out various communications, administrative, transportation, engineer and logistics support tasks. Apart from the more general administrative and support functions, UNPROFOR has identified a need for some 120 specialist personnel, 20 military observers and 20 United Nations civilian police monitors. Furthermore, certain technical equipment will be required, such as all-weather navigation and landing aids, equipment for facilities and runway maintenance, as well as equipment for air traffic control, weather forecasting, and material handling, in order to upgrade the capabilities to handle higher-volume humanitarian airlift operations. An estimate of the cost for the additional requirements and operating the airport will be submitted as an addendum to the present report.

15. A number of Member States have already indicated their willingness to make available as voluntary contributions to the United Nations the necessary specialized personnel and equipment: Norway has agreed to nominate an airport commander, the senior officer and relevant staff; France has agreed to provide an operations officer, air traffic controllers, and fire fighters; the Netherlands has offered the Deputy Base Commander and pertinent staff; Argentina has agreed to provide a meteorologist and other specialists; the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland will provide loading teams as well as an operations officer; Denmark and Portugal are providing other airport personnel; and Germany will provide some equipment. A number of other countries have made offers which have yet to be confirmed. It is anticipated that most facility maintenance can be conducted by UNPROFOR's military/civilian engineers. A

shortfall remains, however, in administration and operations staff as well as for aircraft servicing teams. In order to start the humanitarian airlift operations without delay, it is essential that all required personnel and equipment become available as soon as possible.

16. I should like to express my appreciation to those Member States and regional organizations and arrangements which have lent their political, diplomatic, and material support to UNPROFOR's and UNHCR's efforts in this matter.

VI. OBSERVATIONS

17. Tuzla has been characterized as a unique place in Bosnia and Herzegovina where the three major ethnic groups co-exist in the midst of tragic inter-communal conflict. Combined with the current positive developments in central Bosnia as a result of the cease-fire between the Army of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Croat forces, the early start of a humanitarian airlift to Tuzla, which would permit delivery particularly of spring seeds as well as of some infrastructure support materials, will help ensure the welfare of the inhabitants of the wider Tuzla area and their ability to begin the reconstruction and rehabilitation of a region gravely affected by war. The opening of Tuzla airport for the first UNPROFOR flight on 22 March appears to have made a positive psychological impact on the local population in the region. At the same time, it should be stressed that obstacles remain in the way of an agreement governing the modalities of the full-fledged reopening of the airport. My Special Representative is therefore continuing intensive negotiations with the parties in order to achieve such an agreement.

18. Since the opening of Tuzla airport is being pursued for the purpose of improving the capability to deliver humanitarian assistance, the activity would fall within the existing mandate given by Security Council resolutions 836 (1993) and 844 (1994). UNPROFOR has been proceeding with its plans on that basis. However, in light of the political importance of this action and the need for additional resources to ensure the safe operation of the airport, I believe that the explicit approval and support of the Security Council is required. I would, therefore, recommend that the Security Council approve UNPROFOR's plans for the opening of Tuzla airport for humanitarian purposes and approve the additional resources requested for this purpose. I shall keep the Council informed of developments concerning the reopening of the airport.

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 844 (1993), 836 (1993) AND 776 (1992)

Addendum

1. In my report to the Security Council of 24 March 1994, 1/ I indicated in paragraph 14 that an estimate of the cost to the United Nations of the proposal to increase the mandate and strength of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) would appear separately as an addendum.

2. The additional responsibilities to be undertaken by UNPROFOR and the proposed increase in its strength in relation to the reopening of Tuzla airport are set out in paragraphs 12 to 15 of the main report.

3. It is estimated that the cost associated with the additional responsibilities relating to this enlargement of the mandate and strength of UNPROFOR would amount to some $23.2 million for an initial six-month period. This amount includes the costs for the deployment of 20 military observers, 120 logistic support personnel, 20 civilian police, 12 international civilian staff, 88 local staff and 53 international contractual personnel. A breakdown of the estimated costs for the first six-month period, by main categories of expenditure, is provided for information purposes in the annex to the present addendum. The amount of $23.2 million excludes pledged voluntary contributions in kind from Governments for communications and transport equipment. These voluntary contributions have been provisionally valued at $231,000.

4. It would be my recommendation to the General Assembly, should the Security Council decide to approve the proposed course of action and enlarge the mandate and strength of UNPROFOR, that the additional cost relating thereto should be considered an expense of the Organization to be borne by Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations and that the assessments to be levied on Member States be credited to the UNPROFOR special account.

Notes

1/ S/1994/333.

Annex

Cost estimate of the additional costs to the United Nations for the activities of UNPROFOR

(Thousands of United States dollars)

		Initial six months
1.	Military personnel	2 682
2.	Civilian personnel	1 800
3.	Premises/accommodation	2 076
4.	Infrastructure repairs	440
5.	Transport operations	5 655
6.	Air operations	1 840
7.	Naval operations	-
8.	Communications	972
9.	Other equipment	5 086
10.	Supplies and services	329
11.	Election-related supplies and services	-
12.	Public information programmes	33
13.	Training programmes	-
14.	Mine-clearing programmes	185
15.	Assistance for disarmament and demobilization	-
16.	Air and surface freight	2 013
17.	Integrated Management Information System	-
18.	Support account for peace-keeping operations	62
19.	Staff assessment	62
	Total, lines 1-19	23 235
20.	Voluntary contributions in kind	231
	Total resources	23 466

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LETTER DATED 23 MARCH 1994 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF AZERBAIJAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

In accordance with instructions I have received, I would request you to circulate the statements issued by the Press Service of the Ministry of Defence of Azerbaijan on 22 and 23 March 1994 as a document of the Security Council (see annexes I and II).

(Signed) Yashar T. ALIYEV
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex I

Statement issued by the Press Service of the Ministry of Defence of Azerbaijan on 22 March 1994

On 21 March 1994, throughout the day, Armenian formations attempted to break through to the village of Goradiz, which is on the Azerbaijani-Iranian frontier in the south-west of the Azerbaijani Republic. Having taken the necessary measures in good time, units of the National Army stopped the opposing formations and forced them back to the positions from which they had started. Two of the enemy's vehicles and their personnel were destroyed by artillery as they were preparing to join battle. Today, 22 March 1994, starting at 0800 hours, the enemy once again launched an attack from the vicinity of the formerly occupied settlement of Garakhanbeily in the direction of the village of Alkhanly (Fizuli district). According to preliminary reports, the enemy is using a large number of armoured vehicles in the attack. At about 1030 hours, a bloody battle was being waged in this sector of the front.

Yesterday, from afternoon until late at night, there was intensive shelling from Grad rocket launchers and artillery positions in the direction of Agdam and Terter.

Annex II

Statement issued by the Press Service of the Ministry of Defence of Azerbaijan on 23 March 1994

Yesterday, 22 March 1994, starting at 0800 hours, Armenian military formations, consisting of six tanks, three BMP armoured vehicles and up to one infantry battalion, launched an offensive from the vicinity of the formerly occupied settlement of Garakhanbeily in the direction of the village of Alkhanli (Fizuli district). During the afternoon, units of the Azerbaijani Army destroyed two armoured vehicles and about a dozen enemy soldiers and forced the enemy formations to withdraw to the positions from which they had started. On our side, there were a few wounded.

In the early hours of 23 March 1994, settlements in the frontier area of the Tovuz district of Azerbaijan were shelled by various types of weapons from the vicinity of military bases in the Beras district of Armenia. In the Agdam and Terter sectors of the front a positional battle was being waged with rifle fire.

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LETTER DATED 23 MARCH 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a table showing the numbers of the 97 bombs, shells and missiles left behind by the 30-Power aggression against Iraq and found and disposed of in the various parts of Iraq between 1 and 28 February 1994.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Table

Civil Defence Department	Number and type of ordnance found
Anbar	(a) 39 cluster bombs (b) 17 spherical bombs (c) 5 launcher rockets
Diyala	(a) 5 offensive and defensive hand-grenades (b) 2 armour-piercing shells
Dhi Qar	4 launcher rockets
Muthanna	1 155-mm artillery shell
Ta'mim	(a) 1 helicopter missile (b) 4 60-mm mortar shells (c) 5 VS mines
Maysan	(a) 1 106-mm artillery shell (b) 4 VS mines
Karbala'	1 artillery shell

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LETTER DATED 23 MARCH 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BULGARIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of a letter dated 16 March 1994 from the President of the Republic of Bulgaria, H.E. Mr. Zheliu Zhelev, to the Secretary-General.

I would kindly ask you to bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council in connection with the consideration of the report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 900 (1994).

I would also be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Slavi PASHOVSKI
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 16 March 1994 from the President of Bulgaria to the Secretary-General

I would first of all like to reiterate my excellent impressions of the meetings and talks I have had with you, especially our latest ones during the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly in New York last year. The post of Secretary-General is unique in terms of its place and responsibilities and I would like to assure you of the support which Bulgaria will continue to render to you in the discharge of your mission. Today its importance is more apparent than ever.

As a State Member of the United Nations, Bulgaria is contributing to enhancing the efficiency of international efforts aimed at peace and security, stability and economic development.

A telling example of the new foreign policy of democratic Bulgaria is its attitude towards the crisis brought about by the disintegration of the former Yugoslav federation. From the very beginning, Bulgaria declared that it would not take advantage of the resulting situation. On the contrary, we consider the speedy localization and solution of the conflicts to be in the best interests of our country. Bulgaria stated its decision not to participate in any military way in the events in the former Yugoslavia and appealed to the other Balkan and neighbouring States to adopt the same approach of restraint. Along with this, Bulgaria consistently and energetically supports the peaceful initiatives of the United Nations, the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which can lead to a lasting and equitable solution of the dangerous crisis, whose dimensions are not only regional.

Our desire to see the categorical and well-founded position of the United Nations applied in practice without any military involvement on the part of Bulgaria or other Balkan and neighbouring States is not motivated by any clandestine schemes or unwillingness to bear responsibility. We support the peace-keeping operations of the United Nations. We have proved this with the participation of Bulgaria in the United Nations operation in Cambodia, with the loss of 10 human lives and the expenses incurred by sending Bulgarian "blue helmets" to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia. Here is another argument: Bulgaria strictly observes the sanctions imposed on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) by the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. It is cooperating with the observer missions of the United Nations, the European Union, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Western European Union in accordance with its legal obligations. I avail myself of this opportunity to assure you that Bulgaria will continue to pursue this policy irrespective of the great losses and difficulties in terms of economic reform and Bulgarian exports caused by the implementation of sanctions.

Bulgaria's abstention from participation in military operations in the former Yugoslavia under the auspices of the United Nations is not equivalent to indifference or lack of concern. This position is motivated by the historical

heritage, a recurrence of which would prove fatal for the Balkans. At the beginning of this century a shot fired in Sarajevo resulted in the death of more than 4 million people in the First World War. The Balkan wars in this century alone were four, each one of them more tragic and regrettable than the last. The Balkan States bear the burden of the past and, however noble their motives, any part they take in the military operations in the former Yugoslavia, even in the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), may rouse old suspicions and feuds.

I am well aware of the growing need for a quantitative increase in UNPROFOR, without which the negotiated political compromises and obligations will be endangered. But the risk will be even greater should troops from any one of the Balkan States be included in UNPROFOR. I am confident that you are also aware of this danger and will continue your efforts on behalf of the United Nations to find an adequate solution.

Zheliu ZHELEV
President of the Republic of Bulgaria

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S/1994/337
24 March 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 24 MARCH 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the memorandum of the General Department of Atomic Energy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea dated 19 March 1994.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) PAK Gil Yon
Permanent Representative

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Annex

Memorandum dated 19 March 1994 of the General Department of Atomic Energy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

We have recently accepted the inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) needed for maintaining the continuity of safeguards in accordance with the agreed conclusions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea-United States of America contacts and the Vienna agreement of 15 February 1994 and in keeping with the unique status of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which has suspended the effectuation of its announced withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The recent inspection has enabled the Agency secretariat to confirm fully that the continuity of safeguards has been maintained at our nuclear facilities. The Agency secretariat, however, made its unreasonable assessment of the results of the inspection and on that basis it is seeking to convene a meeting of the Board of Governors in an attempt to adopt an unjust "resolution" against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

In this connection, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's General Department of Atomic Energy considers it necessary to set straight the truth behind IAEA's nuclear inspection in our country, and issues the present memorandum.

1. The character and scope of the recent inspection are as follows:

Pursuant to the outcome of the 29 December 1993 Democratic People's Republic of Korea-United States of America contacts on the nuclear issue, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and IAEA held working-level consultations from 7 January to 15 February this year in Vienna with a view to determining the scope of an inspection needed for the continuity of safeguards.

At the consultations, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea side made it clear that the proposed inspection under discussion would be intended for the continuity of safeguards, and proposed the scope of such an inspection to the Agency. However, the Agency side evaded the discussion of the character of such an inspection from the outset of the consultations, and asked for inspection activities that go far beyond the scope needed for the continuity of safeguards. It accepted that the intended inspection should not include activities of verifying the completeness of the initial inventory of nuclear material, but at the same time asked us to permit the tracing of the exempted nuclear material and the improvement of the already installed spent fuel-rod counter - activities of no relevance at all to the continuity of safeguards - and said that "the inspection in question is the inspection to be performed under the Safeguards Agreement".

The Agency secretariat later withdrew its earlier requests in the face of our legally, scientifically and technologically reasonable points, and agreed to conduct an inspection aimed exclusively at maintaining the continuity of safeguards. This is how the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and IAEA

reached their final agreement on the scope of inspection on 15 February in Vienna.

The agreed inspection is, in terms of time, an activity of verifying that there has been no diversion of nuclear material since the last inspection but does not include, in terms of contents, activities of verifying the completeness of the initial inventory of nuclear material. The Vienna agreement says that the agreed inspection is restricted to providing the continuity of safeguards "but not to perform routine and ad hoc inspections under the Safeguards Agreement. This inspection is aimed to verify non-diversion of nuclear material from the nuclear facilities since the last inspection."

2. We have permitted all the inspection activities specified in the Vienna agreement:

We accepted the IAEA inspection needed for the continuity of safeguards from 1 to 15 March in accordance with the Vienna agreement of 15 February. In accepting the inspection team, we issued entry visas to the IAEA inspectors in time, even before the United States showed any move to implement the agreed simultaneous steps. During the inspection at the seven nuclear facilities, including the experimental nuclear power plant, the radiochemical laboratory and the nuclear fuel-rod fabrication plant, we provided the inspection team with every convenience so as to enable the inspectors to perform their activities - the reloading and servicing of the six surveillance cameras and the spent fuel-rod counter, the replacement of several dozen seals and the thermal luminescence detectors, verification by reading tank levels, gamma-mapping at 15 points, fresh and spent fuel measurements, core fuel and damaged fuel measurements and 35 destructive assay sampling and smear tests with respect to the process scraps and hold-up area, dissolver, waste storage tanks and glove-box area.

We agreed to the requests from the inspection team by showing it all the necessary accounting and operating records and supporting documents for its examination. We afforded active cooperation to the inspectors so that they could smoothly conduct design information verification with regard to any facility modifications or changes in operating conditions. When the Agency inspectors asked for the arrangements needed for the measurements of the damaged fuel at the experimental nuclear power plant, our facility operators provided them with the necessary conditions for their measurements even through complicated process manipulation, despite the risk of exposure to a high-level radioactive dose.

Moreover, when the inspectors proposed a technically impossible way of taking samples in the radiochemical laboratory, our facility operators advanced a realistic way to help them to attain the purpose of their inspection, enabling them to take samples there to support the continuity of safeguards. Under the regulations of the IAEA inspections, IAEA's annual "verification of physical inventory" at a bulk handling facility like our nuclear fuel-rod fabrication plant is supposed to take place only when the operators halt its operation for an overall inventory of the nuclear material.

When the IAEA inspection team asked for the "verification of physical inventory", the operators halted their operation of the necessary process,

although it was not the time for overall inventory-taking, in order to cooperate with inspectors in the work of accounting and measuring the nuclear material held up in the process.

The inspectors thanked us for our cooperation on several occasions. All these facts show that the inspection team carried out all its activities without let or hindrance, as specified in the Vienna agreement. This was mentioned at the informal briefing of the IAEA Board of Governors in Vienna on 16 March, where the IAEA secretariat said that "a great many of the inspection activities agreed to were carried out without obstacles as envisaged".

3. The IAEA secretariat's assessment on the result of the inspection is unreasonable:

No sooner had the inspection team returned than the IAEA secretariat held an informal briefing on 16 March even before the evaluation of the inspection result was available and informed the Board members that "although many of the agreed inspection measures were carried out as envisaged, other important measures which had been agreed were refused".

As a result, the Agency was "not in a position to verify that there had been no diversion of nuclear material at the facility where the relevant measures were rejected". The "refused measures" as described by the IAEA secretariat include the sampling from the input accountability tank of the radiochemical laboratory, gamma mapping in building No. 3 and smear-taking in the glove-box area.

However, we offered our optimal cooperation for all the activities requested by the Agency at these and other facilities. But the "conclusion" that the Agency "was not in a position to verify that there had been no diversion of nuclear material at the radiochemical laboratory" does not stand to reason.

(a) Smear-taking in the glove-box area. The IAEA inspection team requested the smear-taking in the glove-box area on the ground that the surveillance camera had run out of tape and the seals were broken there. During earlier inspections, the inspectors took dozens of smear tests in the glove-box area, but there appeared differences in the measured and analysed value and evaluation of the two sides, which have not yet come to any agreement thereon. In this connection, our side said in its 10 March letter addressed to the inspection team that "this is one of the 'inconsistency' factors".

Therefore, the operator said that he would allow the team to take samples after "clarifying the analytical data of samples taken during previous inspections". But, with a view to maintaining the continuity of safeguards, our operator recommended that the team take samples of the tracer liquid which the inspection team had put into the three tanks during their earlier inspection to freeze this process.

The inspection team agreed to the idea suggested by the operator and retracted its initial request and took solution samples from these tanks. But after taking solution samples, the inspection team abruptly insisted that "the

sampled solution is a good example to show the operator's integrity, but still insufficient for the verification at the glove-box area" and again renewed its request for smear tests.

Such insistence of the inspection team contradicts the IAEA document, which says that "this inspection does not include the verification of the completeness of the initial inventory of nuclear material". This notwithstanding, the IAEA secretariat told the informal briefing that "the smear tests should be taken only after a package agreement had been reached between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America". This is inconsistent with the facts;

(b) Gamma-mapping at filter building No. 3. During the inspection, we permitted "gamma-mapping at a few selected points" where such measurements had taken place before, in line with paragraph 5 of part KDP, chapter II, of the Vienna agreement, and the inspection team performed its gamma-mapping at 15 points. IAEA's request for gamma-mapping at building No. 3 was made for the first time only during the recent inspection.

It is clear to everyone that the repeated measurements at the same points will enable the inspectors to detect any possible changes in the operating status at the specific locations as compared with the previous gamma-mapping. Therefore, the operators said that they would agree to permit gamma-mapping at building No. 3 during the recent inspection if the IAEA inspection team produced any evidence that gamma-mapping had been carried out during the previous inspections at the relevant points of building No. 3. But, without presenting any specific evidence, the inspection team would simply say that the gamma-mapping took place at points of this building, and the very inspector who is alleged to have performed the gamma-mapping said that he himself was not sure of it. According to our records no gamma-mapping has taken place there.

Nevertheless, the IAEA secretariat insisted groundlessly that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had refused its activities;

(c) Solution sampling from the input accountability tank. The inspection team has no reason at all to ask for sampling at this tank, as the Agency's seals remained intact on the inlet/outlet valves of the tank and the necessary gamma-mapping was carried out during its recent inspection. The team's request runs counter to the Vienna agreement, specifically paragraph 6 in part KDP of chapter II that stipulates that "in the specific locations where seals were broken, samplings are permitted to provide the continuity of safeguards".

When we explained that the solution-sampling at the input accountability tank has no relevance to the continuity of safeguards, the inspection team excused itself for its demand by saying that it had "to request the sampling because the solution-sampling from the input accountability tank is the task from the Agency". The inspection team even attempted to realize its unreasonable demand, saying that "we cannot believe the integrity of the one-year-old seals", even though the original seals which they had placed last August remained unbroken on the inlet/outlet valves of the tank. The unreasonable demands were also revealed in the indecisive way the team once abandoned the requested sampling and then demanded it again.

The inspection team confirmed firsthand that the radiochemical laboratory's operating status remains completely frozen by the double and triple system of containment and surveillance. But the inspection team concluded that it was not in a position to verify that no reprocessing activities had occurred at the facility simply for lack of a few smear tests. This conclusion clearly does not make sense in terms of either its scientific and technological aspects or of reason.

4. The IAEA secretariat must rescind its unjust assessment on the results of the recent inspection:

All the facts prove that there can be no justification whatsoever for the IAEA secretariat's unjust assessment of the results of its recent inspection, either in view of the Vienna agreement of 15 February or from the scientific and technological viewpoints. On the basis of its unjust assessment of the results of the recent inspection, the Agency secretariat, is, however, seeking to adopt another "resolution" provoking the Democratic People's Republic of Korea at the meeting of the Board of Governors, only to broaden its partiality further. If the IAEA secretariat sincerely wants to see a fair solution to our "nuclear issue", it must, inter alia, withdraw its unjust and hasty assessment of the results of its recent inspection.

We express our expectation that the IAEA member States will make their unprejudiced assessment of what has happened between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Agency secretariat, on the basis of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea-United States of America agreed conclusions and the Vienna Democratic People's Republic of Korea-IAEA agreement, and oppose and reject the unjust acts on the part of some officials of the IAEA secretariat.

If the IAEA secretariat continues to broaden its partiality, it will be held responsible for the consequences arising therefrom.

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LETTER DATED 22 MARCH 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF KUWAIT TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I transmit herewith a statement, issued by the Council of Ministers of Kuwait following the Council's meeting of Sunday, 20 March 1994, in which Kuwait welcomes the Security Council decision to continue imposing sanctions on Iraq for its refusal to comply with the Security Council resolutions relating to its 1990 aggression against Kuwait.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammad A. ABULHASAN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Statement dated 20 March 1994 by the Council of Ministers of Kuwait

The Council of Ministers of Kuwait welcomed the Security Council decision to continue imposing international sanctions on Iraq for its refusal to comply with the Security Council resolutions relating to its 1990 aggression against Kuwait.

The Council also expressed its satisfaction over the Security Council members' awareness of the policy of aggression of the Iraqi regime and their support for the efforts aimed at ensuring full implementation of the Security Council resolutions relating to the issue of Kuwait.

The Council equally welcomed the insistence of Security Council members that Iraq respect the sovereignty of Kuwait and the inviolability of its territory, which it affirmed as constituting the essence of the above-mentioned Security Council resolutions and as conducive to the establishment of peace and stability in the Gulf region.

UNITED NATIONS

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Security Council

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24 March 1994

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-ninth session
Item 72 of the preliminary list*
MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-ninth year

Letter dated 18 March 1994 from the representatives of Ukraine and the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from our Governments, we have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the Joint Statement on Development of United States-Ukrainian Friendship and Partnership, signed by the Presidents of the United States of America and Ukraine on 4 March 1994 in Washington (see annex).

We should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under item 72 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Madeleine K. ALBRIGHT
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of the
United States of America
to the United Nations

(Signed) Volodymyr D. KHANDOGY
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Permanent Mission of Ukraine
to the United Nations

* A/49/50.

ANNEX

Joint Statement on Development of United States-Ukrainian Friendship and Partnership

On the occasion of their meeting held on 4 March 1994 in Washington, the President of the United States of America, William J. Clinton, and the President of Ukraine, Leonid M. Kravchuk, agree to open a new era in relations between their two nations.

In doing so, they agree to undertake to broaden the context of bilateral relations on the basis of partnership and mutual trust and respect; shared commitment to democracy, human rights and the rule of law; and common goals in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and in the joint interest of promoting free trade, investment and economic cooperation between the two countries.

By embracing these principles, the United States and Ukraine agree to work in friendship in the interests of the mutual well-being of their peoples and in pursuit of an enduring global peace. Embarking on this new era, the two leaders agree to work actively to implement the following comprehensive program of cooperation:

I. SECURITY ASSURANCES

President Clinton and President Kravchuk discussed security assurances for Ukraine and agreed on the importance of such assurances. The sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine are of key importance to the United States. In this regard, as agreed in the Trilateral Statement of 14 January, the United States and other nations are prepared to extend, in the form of a multilateral document, security assurances to Ukraine once the START I Treaty enters into force and Ukraine becomes a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

II. NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION ASSISTANCE ("NUNN-LUGAR")

Under the framework of the Agreement Between the United States of America and Ukraine on the Elimination of Strategic Nuclear Arms and the Prevention of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, of 25 October 1993, the United States of America has committed $177 million in assistance to Ukraine. The United States intends to provide an additional $175 million in fiscal year 1994 and fiscal year 1995. Of this, $100 million will be made available in fiscal year 1994 for projects in the following areas:

(a) The conversion of the defense industry of Ukraine to civilian activities;

(b) The elimination of strategic nuclear arms;

(c) The establishment of a system of export control for the prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction;

(d) The development of state systems of control, accounting and physical protection of nuclear materials.

The United States will also seek an additional $75 million in "Nunn-Lugar" assistance for Ukraine in fiscal year 1995.

The Government of the United States of America, in consultation with the Government of Ukraine, shall expeditiously decide on the appropriate allocation of proposed assistance among these four areas. Once this decision has been made, the two sides shall expeditiously seek to conclude an agreement and three amendments specifying this proposed increase in assistance.

For defense conversion assistance, the two sides shall work to conclude a new implementing agreement between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Engineering, Military-Industrial Complex and Conversion of Ukraine.

For additional strategic nuclear weapon elimination assistance, including assistance for the elimination of SS-19 and SS-24 missiles and silos, additional export control assistance, and additional assistance relating to control, accounting and physical protection of nuclear materials, the two sides shall work to amend the respective implementing agreements concluded in December 1993.

III. ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL COOPERATION

The two leaders agree that expanded bilateral economic ties and commercial cooperation can make a significant contribution to strengthening United States-Ukrainian relations and developing free markets, economic growth and jobs in the two countries. In this regard, both countries attach great significance to their bilateral Agreement on Trade Relations, which came into force on 22 June 1992, and are committed to carrying out its full provisions. The United States and Ukraine also agree to establish a special bilateral commission on trade and investment to expand commercial relations.

Both countries will work to reduce barriers to trade and investment in order to expand access to each other's markets. The United States appreciates the importance of market access for economies in transition, such as Ukraine. The United States has already extended to Ukraine the benefits of the United States Generalized System of Preferences. In their efforts to expand trade, both sides will be guided by the principles of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The United States supports Ukraine's interest in formally applying for GATT membership and is prepared to provide technical assistance to help Ukraine implement a trade regime consistent with GATT rules.

United States private investment in Ukraine can make an important contribution to Ukraine's transition to a market economy. Both sides agree that the signing of an avoidance of double taxation treaty and a bilateral investment treaty, providing comprehensive protection for investors, are important steps to

stimulate private capital flows, but that they need to be accompanied by Ukrainian actions to improve its overall investment climate if the full potential for foreign direct investment is to be achieved.

Both sides agree on the importance of cooperation and information exchange in the area of science and technology. The conclusion of a bilateral science and technology agreement will help formalize Government-to-Government cooperation in this area. In addition, the United States and Ukrainian Governments agree to establish a special joint commission to facilitate cooperation in high technology and scientific research and development. The two Governments agree to cooperate in the field of outer space and to hold early meetings of experts to consider specific issues and areas of cooperation in this field.

The two leaders continue to place the highest priority on the success of political and economic reform in Ukraine. The United States will provide up to $350 million in bilateral economic assistance in fiscal year 1994 to support Ukraine's transition to a market-oriented economy and a democratic society. The United States and Ukraine also agree that international financial institutions, particularly the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), have an essential role to play in providing financial resources to facilitate Ukraine's transition to a market economy. The United States encourages Ukraine to work closely with IMF and IBRD in implementing a program of bold economic reforms. The United States, for its part, is prepared to exercise leadership within the group of seven major industrialized countries to mobilize additional multilateral assistance to support a comprehensive reform program.

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LETTER DATED 24 MARCH 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

As instructed, I have the honour to transmit to you the text of the statement made on 24 March 1994 at a press briefing in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation in connection with the participation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and the text of the statement circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Y. VORONTSOV

94-14953 (E) 250395 250394

Annex

Statement made on 24 March 1994 at a press briefing in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

The question of the participation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is a source of growing concern and anxiety. In keeping with its steadfast and consistent adherence to the non-proliferation Treaty and its determination not to permit the emergence of hotbeds of tension - particularly nuclear - on its borders, the Russian Federation is in favour of a comprehensive settlement of the situation.

First. We are prepared to support the resolution currently under consideration in the Security Council, which calls upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to comply with its obligations vis-à-vis the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under the non-proliferation Treaty. We shall urge the Security Council to take decisive measures in all other situations involving the threat of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, without applying a double standard.

Second. Bearing in mind the fact that the negotiations have been unsuccessful, we consider attempts to solve problems at the bilateral level to be insufficient. We propose a multilateral approach, the focal point of which could be an international conference with the participation of the Russian Federation, China, the United States of America, Japan, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, and representatives of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and of the Director-General of IAEA. That would be the most logical format for the conference, since the above-mentioned countries are situated in the Korean peninsula or in its immediate vicinity and are capable of playing a special role in a settlement.

The agenda for the conference should lead to multifaceted linkages that take into account the legitimate interests of all the parties involved. In particular, topics for discussion and agreement could include the question of guarantees of the security of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea, the promotion of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula with international guarantees of its non-nuclear status, including appropriate international monitoring, and guarantees of non-interference in the internal affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea.

We are convinced that only this approach will make it possible to find mutually acceptable and balanced solutions that strengthen the non-proliferation regime and at the same time prevent a slide towards confrontation.

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24 March 1994

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NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Security Council a report submitted by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

Annex

Letter dated 19 March 1994 from the Executive Chairman of the United Nations Special Commission and the leader of the International Atomic Energy Agency Action Team addressed to the Secretary-General

We have the honour to transmit herewith a report on the high-level talks between the United Nations Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), on the one hand, and the Government of Iraq, on the other, held in New York from 14 to 19 March 1994. We should be most grateful if you could issue instructions for its circulation as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Rolf EKÉUS
Executive Chairman
United Nations Special Commission

(Signed) Maurizio ZIFFERERO
Leader
IAEA Action Team

Appendix

Report on the high-level talks held between Iraq, on the one hand, and the United Nations Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency, on the other

New York, 14-19 March 1994

I. INTRODUCTION

1. As part of the high-level dialogue between the Government of Iraq and the organs of the United Nations charged with the implementation of section C of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) initiated during the visit to Baghdad of the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission in July 1993, a further round of high-level talks was held between Iraq, on the one hand, and the United Nations Special Commission and IAEA, on the other, over the period from 14 to 19 March 1994.

2. Two plenary meetings, led by General Amer for the Iraqi side, were held on 14 and 15 March 1994. The Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq arrived in New York on 15 March, holding separate meetings with the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission and the Leader of the IAEA Action Team on 17 and 18 March 1994 respectively. In addition, 24 meetings were held at the technical level during this period.

3. The Iraqi delegation comprised the following: Tariq Aziz (Deputy Prime Minister), Amer Rashid (Head of the Iraqi Military Industries Authority), Riyadh Al-Qaysi, Ambassador Nizar Hamdoon, Sami Gatie, Hosam Amin, Hamid Ibrahim, Ghazi Najmaldin, Basil Mohammed, Sami Al-Araji, Serour Mahmoud and Sabah Hamad.

4. The Special Commission was represented by Rolf Ekéus (Executive Chairman of the Special Commission), Charles Duelfer (Deputy Chairman of the Special Commission), Henry Arvidsson, Rachel Davies, David Dorn, William Eckert, Amelia Jones, John Larrabee, Patrice Palanque, Annick Paul-Henriot, Jim Poarch, Horst Reeps, Michel Richard, Mark Silver, Nikita Smidovich, Tim Trevan and Andreas Zaugg.

5. The IAEA Action Team was represented by Maurizio Zifferero, Leader of the Action Team, Berhanykun Andemicael, Garry Dillon, Laura Rockwood and Paul Stokes.

II. POLITICAL TALKS

6. During his meetings with the Special Commission and IAEA, the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq repeatedly stated that, in the view of the Government of Iraq, the ongoing monitoring and verification regime was already in place, that Iraq had completed all the actions contemplated of it under paragraph 22 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and hence that it was incumbent upon the Commission and IAEA to report forthwith to the Security Council that the

conditions for the lifting of the oil embargo had been met. He demanded to know when the Special Commission and IAEA would consider the ongoing monitoring and verification system to be in place and when reports under paragraph 22 would be made. He said that the Government of Iraq had concluded that, because such reports had not already been made and no date had been set for such, it could not trust the Executive Chairman or the Special Commission to act objectively in the pursuit of their mandate. He asserted that the Executive Chairman and the Commission were acting out of political motives inconsistent with their mandate. He indicated that serious consequences could ensue if the Commission did not act accordingly.

7. The Executive Chairman of the Special Commission outlined the Commission's approach as follows. Any report to the Security Council reporting full compliance with the terms of paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991) would have to be on the basis of:

(a) The Commission having full information of Iraq's prohibited programmes allowing for a definitive accounting of them;

(b) The establishment of effective ongoing monitoring and verification and the ability of the Special Commission to ensure that its ongoing monitoring and verification plan could be implemented in a manner that would ensure that prohibited programmes could not be reactivated clandestinely.

8. During the technical talks, Iraq had sought, by providing new data, to address the Commission's main outstanding concern - a full accounting of Iraq's former chemical weapons programme. Those new data were welcomed by the Commission. However, there was still the problem of how they could be independently verified by the Commission. The Commission had made suggestions how to address that problem. The Commission continued to discuss with Iraq questions arising from the Commission's investigations into information provided by Iraq on the suppliers of prohibited items.

9. The Executive Chairman pointed out that Iraq had not yet completed all the actions contemplated in paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991) as there still remained the large task of putting in place the system of ongoing monitoring and verification adopted by the Security Council. Doing so would require many additional actions on the part of Iraq.

10. The initiation of those actions had been delayed by Iraq's failure, until November 1993, to recognize the Council's plans, themselves adopted in October 1991 by Security Council resolution 715 (1991) and due to enter into force at that time. The Commission had been ready to initiate implementation of ongoing monitoring and verification at any time Iraq accepted the resolution. Indeed, immediately upon Iraq's acceptance of resolution 715 (1991), the Commission had taken steps to expedite the provision by Iraq of the full initial declarations required under the plans for ongoing monitoring and verification by providing Iraq with prepared formats in which such declarations should be made to assist Iraq in fulfilling its reporting obligations.

11. The initial declarations under resolution 715 (1991) had been received from Iraq in mid-January 1994. In certain areas, they provided sufficient

information to conform with the requirements of the plan. Where that was the case, the Commission had acted without delay to launch baseline inspections and to draft site baseline inspections and to draft site monitoring and verification protocols. A first such major baseline inspection was beginning its work by the end of March. In those areas where the new declarations did not provide full information, the Commission had tried to speed up the process in order to bring the declarations into conformity with Iraq's reporting obligations, thereby permitting the process to be launched in those areas too.

12. The key to the initiation of ongoing monitoring and verification was Iraq's initial declarations - ongoing monitoring and verification must be conducted on the basis of information provided by Iraq to constitute the baseline information for such activities. Without that baseline information from Iraq, the Commission could not undertake useful ongoing monitoring and verification. Thereafter, the establishment and operation of ongoing monitoring and verification would require the full support and cooperation of Iraq at each stage and on a continuing basis.

13. The current status of ongoing monitoring and verification was that the Commission would be launching its first series of baseline inspections in March and April respectively for ballistic missiles and biological activities. While plans were under development for chemical baseline inspections, a date for sending a team to Iraq had not yet been set and was pending the receipt from Iraq of adequate baseline information. During the talks, that had been one of the two major issues discussed, and the Commission hoped that Iraq, in accordance with an undertaking given in the course of the talks, would very soon address the major inadequacies of its earlier initial declarations in the chemical area. Depending on the availability of experts, the Commission would be able to launch chemical baseline inspections shortly after the receipt of adequate initial declarations from Iraq.

14. Once the baseline inspections were concluded and sensors and tags were installed, the Commission should be able to implement ongoing monitoring and verification forthwith. It should prove possible to install sensors and tags within the framework of baseline inspections.

15. As regards IAEA's ongoing monitoring and verification regime, the Leader of the Action Team informed the Deputy Prime Minister that, while elements of the plan had already been phased in, others remained to be implemented, as detailed in the enclosure to the present report. He reaffirmed IAEA's position that it would report to the Security Council under paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991) only after it was satisfied that it was in a position fully to implement its plan.

16. For the Special Commission and the Action Team of IAEA, the situation was very clear: their mandate was that of the relevant Security Council resolutions and the Charter of the United Nations. Their only objectives were to fulfil, to the satisfaction of the Council, their technical mandates as soon as feasible.

III. TECHNICAL TALKS

17. As noted above, technical talks were held in each of the four weapons categories. They concentrated on plans for implementing ongoing monitoring and verification, with the Iraqi side pushing for timetables by which each activity would be complete. The Commission and IAEA explained what their current intentions were for conducting such activities but pointed out that, in most instances, the speed with which they could proceed was dependent upon Iraqi actions, especially in relation to the provision of information. The Commission explained in detail in each of its areas the modalities it intended to use for ongoing monitoring and verification, including the types of sites to be monitored, and the types of sensors and tags to be used.

18. In both the chemical and the ballistic missiles areas, talks also covered past weapons programmes. In the chemical weapons area, talks covered the importation of raw materials and equipment for the production of chemical weapons and a detailed breakdown of precursor chemical imports against production capacity and actual production of chemical warfare agents. In the ballistic missiles area, talks covered the expenditure of SCUD-derivative missiles and information arising from the Commission's investigations into Iraq's missile and related equipment supplier network (see enclosure).

Enclosure

Technical talks

A. Missile issues

1. The missile working group had seven meetings to discuss the issues related to ongoing monitoring and verification, forthcoming inspection activities and Iraq's disclosures of prohibited programmes.

2. The primary focus was on ongoing monitoring and verification. The Special Commission outlined to the Iraqi side current activities to establish as soon as feasible a workable mechanism and practical modalities for monitoring pursuant to the ongoing monitoring and verification plan approved by resolution 715 (1991). That included the assessment of Iraq's initial declarations submitted under the plan, identification of sites to be monitored and appropriate monitoring technologies and preparation of ongoing monitoring and verification protocols with specific guidelines for future monitoring inspections. The Iraqi side informed the Commission of its efforts to support the early establishment of the ongoing monitoring and verification mechanism. They included trial exercises to familiarize Iraqi personnel with the monitoring modalities envisaged under the ongoing monitoring and verification plan and to gain experience in support of monitoring activities.

3. During the talks, progress was made in the identification of facilities and specific items to be monitored. Useful discussions were held on sensor technology, including cameras and tags to be used for monitoring. The Iraqi side submitted additional reports on a number of facilities identified by the Commission for monitoring. The Commission welcomed the work being done by the Iraqi side to facilitate the early establishment of the ongoing monitoring and verification mechanism. A schedule of forthcoming missile-related activities was provided to the Iraqi side. Iraq promised continued cooperation with the Special Commission and outlined specific contributions that the Iraqi side be prepared to make at each stage of establishing the ongoing monitoring and verification mechanism under resolution 715 (1991).

4. Based on the results of the Commission's investigation of information on foreign suppliers of prohibited items submitted previously by Iraq, the Commission asked the Iraqi side to clarify some issues. Iraq reaffirmed that all prohibited items that had been imported by Iraq had been fully reported to the Commission and it had nothing substantial to add. Some further information, including identification of specific suppliers and supplier's network, was provided by Iraq and could assist the Commission in its efforts to have a complete understanding of Iraq's past programmes and in its further investigations.

5. The Commission also continued discussions with Iraq on the past expenditure of prohibited missiles in order fully to understand the documentation recently provided by Iraq on that subject. As a result, Iraq undertook to submit to the Commission a new declaration with a precise accounting of all prohibited missiles obtained and used by Iraq. The new declaration is to substitute the

relevant portion of the "Full, final and comprehensive report on ballistic missile activity" submitted by Iraq in May 1992.

B. Chemical issues

6. In the course of nine meetings, the Iraqi side presented additional information about its past chemical weapons programme. This included data on the importation of precursor chemicals and a time correlation between declared production quantities of chemical warfare agents, imported precursor chemicals and installed production capacity. These new data were based on additional efforts by Iraq (instigated at the Commission's insistence) to collect indirect substantiation of the facts and figures contained in its declarations. In the absence of documentation, the Iraqi side interviewed in early February additional senior Iraqi personnel associated with the past chemical weapons programme, among them the former head of Al Muthanna for the period from 1981 to 1987. The new data concerning precursors are partly based on barrel counting and partly on calculations. This information seems credible, and provides an accounting of Iraq's past programmes that is more internally consistent than previous accounts. However, further evaluation by the Commission will require its experts to hold discussions with those former Iraqi officials recently interviewed by the Iraqi authorities.

7. As Iraq had failed to complete fully the formats for its initial declaration in the chemical area, the Commission once again explained in detail how these formats should be completed. Emphasis was placed on what was expected of Iraq in relation to questions not answered in its January 1994 declarations. In particular, Iraq was asked to prepare completed formats for sites identified by the Commission as requiring baseline inspections but for which Iraq had yet to submit baseline data in the form of initial declarations.

8. During the talks a letter was handed to Iraq from the Commission, containing the Commission's decisions on the fate of chemical production equipment associated with Iraq's past programmes. During the last meeting, the Iraqi side presented improvised plans for the future use of some of the dual-use equipment concerned. The Iraqi side was asked to provide the Commission with detailed plans for the use of each item of equipment by 30 April 1994 at the latest.

9. Finally, the Iraqi side presented data it felt could constitute site protocols for 15 chemical sites. Iraq drew on the model of a site protocol prepared by the Commission for the Ibn Al-Baytar facility. These will be evaluated for their applicability to the Commission's needs.

C. Biological activities

10. The biological working group held three meetings. The main issues discussed were the formats in which Iraq should make the initial and regular reports on biological activities due under the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification; monitoring and verification protocols for biological sites to be monitored; Iraqi suggestions for modalities to be used in biological monitoring

and verification activities; and the Commission's plans for conducting such activities.

11. The Commission informed the Iraqi side that it intended to conduct a series of biological baseline inspections starting in April 1994, to include all of the sites declared by Iraq in its initial declarations. A full description of the Commission's plans for implementing ongoing monitoring and verification is found in the attachment to the present document.

12. As had been agreed earlier, the Commission handed to the Iraqi side a revised version of the formats for Iraq's declarations due under the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification. The differences between this version and earlier ones were highlighted and the reasons for them explained. Iraq was asked to ensure that its initial declarations cover the period required by the plan, namely 1 January 1986 to July 1993, and to provide a six-monthly declaration for the period 15 July 1993 to 15 January 1994. At the request of Iraq, it was given an electronic copy of the revised formats.

13. Iraq explained actions it had taken in preparation for ongoing monitoring and verification, including the drafting of "preliminary formats for the monitoring and verification protocol" for 16 of the declared biological sites. While these were accepted by the Commission, Iraq was notified that the Commission's biological baseline inspection team would draw up protocols specifically designed for the biological area which might differ greatly from those prepared by Iraq, as the latter were based on the Commission's chemical monitoring and verification protocols.

14. Iraq also presented its ideas on how ongoing monitoring and verification might be conducted in the biological area. It had prepared monitoring suggestions for three of the declared sites and presented its findings on one - a vaccine production institute. The modalities proposed included interviews with key site personnel, material balance accounting, sample-taking, checks of quality controls and inventories, availability of documentation and records (both medical and personnel) to inspectors, and camera monitoring.

D. Nuclear issues

15. The IAEA representatives and the Iraqi nuclear team reviewed the progress made in recent months, with particular reference to the verification of the information provided by Iraq on suppliers of material and equipment and the sources of technical advice. A review was also made of the other information required to be provided by Iraq under the terms of IAEA's plan for ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq, with a view to identifying still outstanding matters.

16. IAEA referred to the letter dated 13 October 1993 addressed to the Secretary-General (see S/26584, annex), by the Director General of IAEA, in which was detailed the position of IAEA in the light of the outcome of the high-level technical talks held in Baghdad from 30 September to 8 October 1993. In that letter, the Director General explained that the long-requested critical information concerning suppliers of prohibited and other material and the

sources of technical advice, finally provided during that round of high-level technical talks, had to be verified for accuracy and completeness before Iraq would be regarded as having complied with all of the disclosure requirements concerning its nuclear activities. In the letter, the Director General also stated that, before the Agency would be ready to report Iraq's compliance with paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 of resolution 687 (1991), IAEA would have to satisfy itself that it was in a position to implement fully the ongoing monitoring and verification plan, which would also require the prior receipt from Iraq of the data foreseen in the annexes to the IAEA plan.

17. IAEA acknowledged the progress achieved thus far in the corroboration of the information provided by Iraq on suppliers and sources of technical advice and expressed its confidence that this verification could be completed with the assistance of Member States within a short time. It also acknowledged the Iraqi efforts to complete the information required under the provisions of the annexes to the plan. It was concluded that, as far as the information requirements were concerned, the necessary actions were close to satisfactory completion.

18. As regards the full implementation of the ongoing monitoring and verification plan, discussions were held on ways to achieve an expeditious phasing in all of the remaining measures contemplated in the plan. The possibility was envisaged of Iraq sending to Vienna a technical delegation to provide clarifications useful to IAEA in its finalizing of the inspection protocols for each facility/installation/site relevant to the plan.

19. IAEA also indicated that it would proceed to the deployment of surveillance equipment, which entailed the identification of optimal locations for the placement of such equipment, the installation of the equipment and the assurance of its proper functioning. That would be achieved through the dispatch by IAEA of specialized teams dedicated to such purposes. It was suggested that a reasonable target for completion of such activities, as currently contemplated, under optimal circumstances might be, at a minimum, a matter of three to four months. Confidence was expressed that, by adopting such an approach, and assuming the continued full cooperation of the Iraqi authorities, the time needed for IAEA to assure itself of its ability to implement its plan fully would be minimized.

20. The Iraqi team expressed its strong wish for a specific date by which IAEA would submit to the Security Council the report of Iraq's technical compliance with the relevant paragraphs of resolution 687 (1991). IAEA referred to the outstanding actions which would need to be completed before it would be in a position to conclude that such a report was possible, as outlined above. It was recognized that IAEA was in a different position from the Special Commission in so far as IAEA had already started phasing in elements of its long-term monitoring plan and that, as a consequence, the IAEA report could well precede that of the Special Commission. However, the IAEA representatives stated that it would not be possible or practical to provide a specific date by which that might happen.

Attachment

Activities planned by the Special Commission to implement the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification

A. Introduction

1. The Special Commission intends to conduct its ongoing monitoring and verification activities in accordance with its plan, approved by Security Council resolution 715 (1991) (see S/22871/Rev.1).

2. This plan requires Iraq to make initial declarations about its dual-purpose activities covering a period before the Gulf War to the present date. It is also predicated on the Commission having the full, final and complete disclosures of Iraq's prohibited programmes as required under Security Council resolutions 687 and 707 (1991). Together, these two sets of declarations make up the baseline data on which ongoing monitoring and verification activities are to proceed. Without these data, the Commission cannot guarantee that its ongoing monitoring and verification activities will be effective. These data on dual-purpose activities are also to be updated every six months by Iraq.

3. On the basis of these data, the Commission assesses Iraq's dual-purpose capabilities in all areas of relevance to the plan. From this assessment, which is an ongoing process given the dynamic nature of the Iraqi industrial base, the Commission identifies sites, equipment and materials that may need to be monitored. In parallel, the Commission has sought, and will continue to seek, to identify technologies that would assist in the monitoring process in each area, to increase both the effectiveness and the efficiency of the regime.

4. Having identified the items of potential interest to ongoing monitoring and verification, the Commission intends to launch baseline inspections at each relevant site in order to verify the Iraqi declarations, to assess how the items of interest should be monitored (including the most relevant technologies to be used), and to draw up a monitoring and verification protocol for each site so inspected. These protocols will contain, inter alia, a description of the site and of the items or activities of interest to ongoing monitoring and verification and prescriptions for the conduct of ongoing monitoring and verification at that site. On the basis of these recommendations and after review of them at the Commission's headquarters in New York, decisions will be made on the most appropriate form of ongoing monitoring and verification for each site and the relevant sensors, recording devices, seals or tags installed. Thereafter, ongoing monitoring and verification activities will proceed on the basis of the site monitoring and verification protocols, as amended over time to reflect changes to the sites concerned, to the items contained therein or of the activities conducted thereat.

5. In order to expedite this process, the Commission has conducted a number of seminars at its headquarters in New York with international experts. These seminars have sought to identify ways and means of conducting ongoing monitoring and verification in the most efficient manner consistent with effectiveness and

to assess the current status of the Commission's knowledge about Iraq's past programmes and current dual-purpose capabilities.

6. Furthermore, the Commission is in the process of recruiting additional personnel to ensure adequate resources for the added work brought about by Iraq's acceptance of resolution 715 (1991), in November 1993, and the process of initiating ongoing monitoring and verification. So far, two additional biological experts have been recruited, as have one chemical and one missile expert. Recruitment has been initiated for a further three chemical experts and one biological and one missile expert. In addition, the Commission is seeking to recruit an expert on sensor technologies and three data collators to assist in the processing of the very large quantities of data generated by the ongoing monitoring and verification process. Additional computing capacity has been purchased and plans are in place to establish a monitoring centre in Baghdad.

B. Activities currently planned

1. Missile-related activities

7. Based on the overall concept for establishing ongoing monitoring and verification under Security Council resolution 715 (1991), the following activities in the missile area are envisaged:

(a) Protocol-building:

(i) A team will be tasked to prepare draft site monitoring and verification protocols for a number of facilities to be monitored in Iraq. The team will prepare guidelines related to ground inspections and submit recommendations for sensor monitoring and tagging at each facility that will be visited;

(ii) The team will visit all facilities identified to date as being subject to monitoring except for sites that are abandoned or under construction. The team will not conduct any activities related to operational missiles;

(iii) The current planning for this inspection provides for arrival of the team in Iraq on 30 March 1994. The team will continue its work through a succession of rounds of visits to Iraq until the accomplishment of all its tasks. It is anticipated that this will take at least two months;

(b) Monitoring sensor installation:

(i) Based upon recommendations of the protocol-building team, decisions will be taken by the Special Commission on specific sensor packages that will be installed at facilities to be monitored. The configuration of sensor packages will depend on the type of facility, level of activities and other relevant factors. Currently camera systems and tags have been identified as available and suitable technologies to assist monitoring;

(ii) After decisions are taken to install specific sensors at specific facilities, a procurement process will start. The Special Commission is currently establishing contacts that will allow rapid procurement once decisions are taken;

(iii) Once sensors are procured, a team will go to Iraq to start the installation of sensors. The installation operation may require several visits to Iraq. It is anticipated that the installation operation may start before the end of May;

(c) Tagging of missiles:

(i) In accordance with the ongoing monitoring and verification plan under Security Council resolution 715 (1991), monitoring covers missiles designed for use, or capable of being modified for use, in a surface-to-surface role with a range greater than 50 kilometres;

(ii) The Special Commission is currently working on operational procedures to ensure the safety of tagging activities. The completion of these procedures will require coordination with Governments that are expected to supply personnel for this operation;

(iii) Once the safety issues are resolved and appropriate training is conducted, a team will be sent to Iraq to begin tagging operations. Owing to the significant number of missiles involved and safety requirements, it is anticipated that several visits will be required to complete the tagging operation. These visits will also include surveys of the relevant facilities.

2. Chemical activities

8. The Commission is currently installing in Iraq chemical sensors on a trial basis. If successful, additional sensors could be installed near dual-purpose sites. These sensors would be able to detect trace elements of chemicals in the effluents of chemical facilities, which in turn would indicate the types of chemicals being produced at the said site.

9. In April, the Commission intends to send a mission to Iraq to interview those senior Iraqi personnel recently interviewed by Iraq itself as part of its efforts to complete its accounting for its past chemical weapons programme. The aim of this mission would be to try to obtain information that might help the Commission to verify independently, either directly or indirectly, Iraq's account of its programme. Such verification is required to help to ensure that the Commission starts its chemical ongoing monitoring and verification activities using, as far as possible, accurate baseline information. A further team will, in the first week of April, start the destruction of chemical production equipment used in Iraq's former chemical weapons programme, as required by resolution 687 (1991).

10. Thereafter, the Commission intends to launch its first chemical baseline inspections in May 1994. However, the date for launching these inspections is

very much dependent upon Iraq first completing its initial declarations due under the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification in the format prepared by the Commission and for all the sites at which the Commission intends to conduct baseline inspections.

11. Also in May 1994, two inspections are planned for the Muthanna facility: one to conduct a survey of the site using analytical instrumentation to ensure that there remain no munitions or chemicals at the site which should be destroyed under the terms of resolution 687 (1991). A second mission will formally close down the Commission's Chemical Destruction Group's operations at the site. This, like the mission described in the preceding paragraph, is aimed at helping to ensure that chemical ongoing monitoring and verification activities start on the correct basis, i.e. one in which Iraq's past chemical weapons capabilities have been fully accounted for and eliminated.

3. Biological activities

12. The Commission plans to launch baseline inspections in the biological area in the second week of April, to include at least all of the sites declared by Iraq in its initial declarations of January 1994. To facilitate these baseline inspections, Iraq has been requested to resubmit in the revised formats as soon as possible its initial declarations in this area. Iraq was also requested to provide a written statement for each site in advance of the inspections, giving an overview of the work and equipment at that site of relevance to ongoing monitoring and verification.

13. The Commission has also planned a number of other activities. In May, it is intended to conduct an inspection to tag key items of equipment identified during the baseline inspections. Also in May, it is intended to hold a series of seminars between Commission personnel and international experts on biological issues. There will be seminars on reviewing the information obtained from the baseline inspections to assess where monitoring and verification effort should be focused in the biological area; sensor technologies that might be of use at biological sites; and a full review of Iraq's past and current biological activities in order to assess whether the Commission has indeed accounted for all the materials and equipment of concern and ensure that these will be adequately monitored under the plans drawn up by the Commission.

14. On the basis of these seminars, a further round of inspections will be conducted at sites identified as key in the biological area in order to complete the site-monitoring and verification protocol-writing process for these sites. Current plans are for that inspection to be launched in June 1994.

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Forty-eighth session
Agenda item 35
QUESTION OF PALESTINE

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-ninth year

Letter dated 24 March 1994 from the Permanent Representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

In my capacity as Chairman of the Arab Group for March 1994, I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter from the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States addressed to you concerning the attacks by the Israeli authorities on a building in Hebron, that resulted in the death of a number of Palestinian citizens, including two women, one of them pregnant, as well as the curfew in the city.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly under agenda item 35, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ali Ahmed ELHOUDERI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of
the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
to the United Nations
Chairman of the Arab Group

ANNEX

Letter dated 24 March 1994 from the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States to the Secretary-General

I received with extreme concern the news that the Israeli authorities had carried out a large-scale military operation in the heart of Hebron in the occupied West Bank, in the course of which they besieged a building consisting of three homes and trained their artillery on it for 18 hours, without heed for its civilian inhabitants, causing the death of a number of Palestinian citizens, including two women, one of them pregnant.

Furthermore, the Israeli occupation authorities have been imposing a curfew on 120,000 Palestinian citizens in the same city since 25 February 1994, on the pretext of protecting 400 Israeli settlers, as has been acknowledged by the Israeli Prime Minister.

This fresh Israeli massacre comes in the wake of the adoption of Security Council resolution 904 (1994), which calls for the provision of international protection for the Palestinian people in the occupied territories, in order to demonstrate to the entire world Israel's insistence on continuing its breach and defiance of the will of the international community and the resolutions of international legitimacy and the spuriousness of its claims regarding the seriousness of its commitment to the peace process.

The General Secretariat of the League of Arab States vehemently condemns this blatant Israeli violation of all international instruments and resolutions and human rights principles and calls on the United Nations to move swiftly and decisively for the halting of these inhuman practices, the immediate implementation of Security Council resolution 904 (1994) and the establishment of a mechanism to ensure the protection of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories.

The peace process is now exposed to a severe trial that threatens to bring it to a standstill or a breakdown, now that confidence in the feasibility of resuming the talks and making progress in them has begun to dwindle as a consequence of the bloody events and the massacres taking place in the occupied territories.

The United Nations is faced with a legal and moral duty to protect the Palestinian people in the occupied Arab territories and to ensure respect for its resolutions.

I am confident that you will accord this matter the prompt attention that it merits, for the sake of protecting the process of peace in the region and preserving the credibility of the international Organization vis-à-vis world public opinion and Arab public opinion in particular.

(Signed) Ahmed Esmat ABDEL MEGUID
Secretary-General of the
Arab League

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S/1994/343
25 March 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 24 MARCH 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF GEORGIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On behalf of my Government, I have the honour to inform you of the readiness of the Georgian side to continue the negotiations on the comprehensive political settlement of the conflict in Abkhazia.

Georgian leadership highly appreciates the efforts of the United Nations and personally yours in the achievement of peace in the region and for survival of hundreds of thousands suffering refugees and displaced persons.

We will highly appreciate it if you circulate this letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Peter CHKHEIDZE
Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative

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S/1994/344
25 March 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 25 MARCH 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit a statement of the Spokesman of the General Department of Atomic Energy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea dated 24 March 1994.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) PAK Gil Yon
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Statement dated 24 March 1994 of the Spokesman of the General Department of Atomic Energy of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

At the recent meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the forces hostile to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea adopted an unreasonable "resolution" against it in defiance of the opposition of many countries and presented it to the United Nations Security Council.

This indicates that the IAEA secretariat is further internationalizing the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's "nuclear issue", joining the hostile forces in the efforts to stifle the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and is further broadening its partiality, instead of rectifying it.

The "resolution" alleged that the "non-compliance with the Safeguards Agreement has grown in scope" because we did not allow some of the activities for the continuity of safeguards. This is an assertion totally reversing black and white.

Now we are in a special status with the temporary suspension of the effectuation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's declared withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. So, we are not under obligation to accept routine and ad hoc inspections under the Safeguards Agreement.

What we can allow at this moment is only an inspection for the maintenance of the continuity of safeguards.

The latest inspection by the inspectors group of IAEA was enough to fully confirm that nuclear materials had not been diverted at our nuclear facilities and to definitely maintain the continuity of safeguards.

Therefore, no one can find fault with the results of the recent inspection, saying they are "not satisfactory", and, in particular, they are not qualified even to talk about the alleged "non-compliance with the Safeguards Agreement".

We cannot but take a serious view of the fact that the "resolution" urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to "immediately allow IAEA to complete all requested inspection activities as the first step and to comply fully with the Safeguards Agreement".

During the recent inspection, we fully allowed all inspection activities needed for maintaining the continuity of safeguards in accordance with the Vienna agreement, and we have nothing more to "allow".

The Director General of IAEA himself in his report and address at the meeting of the Board of Governors admitted that all inspection activities had been carried out satisfactorily as demanded by the IAEA secretariat at most of the nuclear facilities.

As for the smear-taking in the glove-box area at the radiochemical laboratory, with which the IAEA secretariat takes issue, it has nothing to do with the maintenance of the continuity of safeguards.

So, the insistence on smear-tests in this area contradicts the Vienna agreement, which says that "this inspection does not include the verification of the completeness of the initial inventory of nuclear material".

Moreover, the smear-taking at the area is a matter of relevance to "inconsistency", an outstanding issue between the two sides.

However, in the spirit of cooperation, we proposed the method of taking samples of tracer liquid whereby to inspect more effectively the glove-box area.

This liquid is what the secretariat of IAEA had put into the three tanks in the glove-box area during their earlier inspection to freeze the outflow of nuclear material in the area.

Accordingly, solution samplings were enough to verify whether or not nuclear material had been diverted in the area.

The inspectors group itself agreed to our constructive proposal and took samples of tracer liquid there.

This notwithstanding, the IAEA secretariat argued in a far-fetched manner that they could not "verify that no reprocessing activities had occurred at the radiochemical laboratory", simply because their request to make a few smear tests was not accepted.

This is unreasonable either from the scientific-technological point of view or in view of the Vienna agreement.

All the facts clearly prove that the purpose of the recent inspection by the IAEA secretariat was not to verify whether or not nuclear materials had been diverted at our nuclear facilities, but to pursue a sinister political aim from the beginning according to a prearranged script.

The IAEA secretariat broadened its partiality still further by adopting another unreasonable "resolution" at the meeting of the Board of Governors.

If the IAEA secretariat really wants to see a fair solution to our "nuclear issue", it should take measures to immediately withdraw its "resolution" which is based on the unjust assessment that IAEA "could not verify non-diversion of nuclear materials" at the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear facilities.

If the IAEA secretariat fails to take measures to retract its unreasonable "resolution", we will have no alternative but to take practical steps to counter the broadening partiality on the part of the IAEA secretariat, and the IAEA secretariat will be held totally responsible for all the consequences arising therefrom.

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-eighth session
Agenda item 52
THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-ninth year

Letter dated 23 March 1994 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Greece to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the English and French versions of a communiqué on the situation in Afghanistan, issued on 17 March 1994 on behalf of the European Union by its Presidency.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 52, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Adamantios Th. VASSILAKIS
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
Deputy Permanent Representative

ANNEX

Communiqué on the situation in Afghanistan, issued on 17 March 1994 on behalf of the European Union by its Presidency

The European Union welcomes the arrival at Kabul of the first convoy of six United Nations trucks and the distribution of food supplies among the suffering population in all areas of the capital. These food supplies represent only a limited part of the assistance needed to alleviate the plight of several hundred thousand citizens exposed to starvation. The European Union expects that such deliveries will continue unhindered to all sections of the population in the future. In this connection, the European Union values all efforts by neighbouring countries as essential in order to facilitate the purchase of goods and the transport of humanitarian assistance to Kabul and to other provinces of the country.

The European Union expresses its full support for the efforts of the United Nations and other humanitarian agencies to relieve suffering in Afghanistan and urges all Afghan parties to take immediate unconditional steps for lifting the blockade of kabul and to ensure free access of relief as well as rehabilitation supplies to the city of Kabul and to other parts of the country.

Recalling its statement of 7 February 1994, the European Union renews its appeal for an immediate cessation of hostilities in Afghanistan and for the beginning of peaceful negotiations.